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1. ABSTRACT
This extended essay aims to assess the future of the Republican Peopleʼs Party (CHP) of 
Turkey, with the question analyzed being “In order to regain more relevance in Turkish 
Politics, how should the CHP revise its social and political values, which values should be 
added?”.  In order to set the scene, a condensed account of how the CHP adopted its cur-
rent values is given in the beginning of the essay. This is followed by a profound assess-
ment of the relevance of Kemalist and social democratic theories and their applications by 
the CHP has been made, and suggestions for revisions with reasons. These assessments, 
along with independent suggestions, have been mainly supported by the Kemalist, social-
democratic theories and the Rawlsian theory of justice. The investigation of relevance and 
the assessment for revision starts from the foundation of the Turkish republic and the CHP 
and reaches our current day. Incidents attesting relevance, recent poll, election and refer-
endum have also been utilized in the assessment and in have served as bases in forming 
suggestions. The Kemalist and social-democratic principles have been differentiated and 
assessed separately while although they do hold similarities, they are essentially different 
theories. The conclusion drawn from this essay is that, the CHP should revise its values to 
emphasize social-democratic values more than Kemalism, while also emphasizing the 
principles of populism and revolutionism of Kemalism. It has further been asserted that the 
CHP should defend freedoms, both in the negative and the positive sense. It has been 
proposed that the CHP to act as the problem-solver, given its revolutionist identity and its 
having founded modern Turkey.
Word Count: 270
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2. Introduction and Context
This essay aims to assess the relevance of the values that the CHP upholds as a self-
labeled Kemalist, social-democratic, left-wing political party to contemporary Turkish poli-
tics. The question under scrutiny has been whether these values are still relevant and how 
should they be amended or revised. My aim has not been to suggest the CHP ways to 
gather more votes but my humble assertion is that this essay may help in defining and as-
sessing the role of an important political institution of Turkey and suggesting a revision for 
its relevance. This essay aims to suggest a transition for the self-labeled revolutionist CHP 
for adaptation to modern day Turkey.
a. Introduction to Turkish Politics and the Republican Peopleʼs Party (CHP)
i. Republican Era Turkey and the CHP
In order to better evaluate the relevance of the Republican Peopleʼs Partyʼs values to 
modern day Turkey, it would be logical to start with an outline of politics of Turkey and how 
the CHP came to adopt its current values. For these purposes, I will first outline the politi-
cal system of Turkey.
The Grand National Assembly of Turkey was founded in 1920, without the presence of 
any political parties. With a brief period of bicameralism in Turkey between the two coups 
dʼetat (1961-1980), Turkeyʼs main legislative organ has been the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey. 
Turkeyʼs oldest political party which serves as the main opposition today, the CHP was 
officially founded in 1923 (the same year the republic was formed) and was the major insti-
tution of the single-party period. As its founder, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was also the foun-
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der of the Republic of Turkey and was elected the president of the National Assembly, the 
CHP can be regarded to be “the Party that formed the state”1. The Grand National Assem-
bly of Turkey had been stated to be anti-imperialist and defending the right of legitimate 
self-defense of the Turkish nation, it has further been asserted that the Grand National As-
sembly aimed to bring the sovereignty of the people of Turkey 2. 
In the second convention of the CHP, the bylaws were changed to include republican-
ism, populism (this differs from the Western understanding, states the holder of sover-
eignty is the Turkish nation) and nationalism (based on citizenry, not ethnicity)3. These are 
the first three of the “6 arrows” which are the original principles of Kemalism and the CHP. 
The last three arrows of secularism, revolutionism and statism, were added to the bylaws 
in the third congress of the party in 19314. As its founding principles suggest, the CHP ad-
vocates the secular nation-state and the values proposed by the six arrows (which consti-
tute its emblem).
ii. The Second Transition and Adoption of Social Democratic Values
After the Early Republican Era (the death of Musta Kemal Ataturk), the party was un-
der the leadership of Inonu. In a convention in 1966, the “left of centre” view of Inonu was 
adopted as the Partyʼs ideology5. While the founding principles of the CHP did suggest 
such values to a degree, the CHP was more a centre party, which did not have outright left 
or right inclinations. This is supported by the fact that the Democrat Party, which went on 
to have right-wing liberal rhetoric and defeat the CHP in the general elections of 1950, also 
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1 (Bila, page 14)
2 (Arar, pages 15-16)
3 (Giritlioğlu, pages 68-73)
4 (Konda Research 2010, page 2)
5 (Konda Research 2010, page 3)
marking the successful transition to the multi-party system, had been founded by CHP 
members 6. 
In 1974, the bylaws were amended in accord with the “democratic leftist” rhetoric7.  In 
addition to the “six arrows”, the following were adopted in 1976 under the leadership of the 
social-democrat leader Ecevit, pursuing the democratic leftist rhetoric and aims. Six new 
rules, freedom, equality, solidarity, supremacy of labor, integrity of development and self-
rule of the public were adopted. This marked the total democratic left-wing transition of the 
CHP which re-structured itself as a “social democratic” party. Same year, the CHP became 
a member of the “Socialist International”8, an international organization for “social demo-
cratic, socialist and labour parties”9. 
iii. The Military Coup and the Second Coming of the CHP
After the military coup of 1980, the CHP, along with all other political parties, was abol-
ished. Many other institutions that followed the Kemalist and Social Democratic line of 
CHP followed, and in 1992 after a law allowing the founding of political parties with the 
names before the coup, the CHP was formed again. Under Baykalʼs leadership (from 
1992-2010, with short breaks), the CHP was the main opposition and structured its opposi-
tion mainly on the conservation of the secular values. The CHP was more distanced from 
social-democratic values in this period and was widely recognized to be politically statist. It 
was even speculated that the CHP was to be banned from the Socialist International10. 
The major criticism of the CHP under Baykalʼs rule was about its hesitancy to change and 
its conformist attitude towards its share of vote. The CHP was regarded too rigidly Kemal-
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6 (Ahmad, page 123)
7 (Konda Research 2010, page 3)
8 (NTVMSNBC Archives, June 29 2008)
9 (Socialist International Web Site)
10 (Gürsel, July 6 2008)
ist. It is often stated that, the CHP has not revered its social democratic principles in this 
era and became more of the statist, rigid party it was. It is further asserted that this has 
caused it to lose its bonds with the hopeless and outcasted masses, which could identify 
themselves with social democracy11. The current bylaws of the CHP, which was formed in 
this era, does explicitly state that the CHP is a democratic left-wing party that defends the 
six arrows as outlined by its bylaws and the “Universal Values of Social Democracy” (in-
cluding a wider list of social democratic principles than the 1974 bylaws had12). 
iv. Back to Social Democracy
After Baykal resigned from his position after an outbreak of a crisis about his personal 
life, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu took leadership and he has been largely regarded as the leader 
who could make the CHP a true alternative to the right-wing conservative, ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP)13. After Kılıçdaroğlu took the position in may 201014, he re-
inforced the social-democratic rhetoric he employed in the party convention. He is re-
garded to be trying to take the CHP from the “statist” position of the Baykal period, back to 
the CHP of the 1970s, and to its social democratic roots and to the “populist arrow” of the 
six arrows, as some influential columnists state15. 
The values that the CHP champions are as outlined above. “The six arrows of Kemal-
ism” and (a more comprehensive version of) the “six social-democratic pillars” of Ecevitʼs 
era are still the main principles of the party. However, going back to the 1970s rhetoric 
without any further change may be disastrous as Turkey has evolved. 
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11 (Tosun, page 6)
12 (CHP Web Site, Bylaws)
13 (Cemal, December 2010)
14 (Milliyet Web Site, 22 May 2010)
15 (Muhtar, 22 December 2010)
The aim of this essay is not to advise the CHP on how to become a catch-all party, but 
it is to suggest a newly molded ideological stance that fits with the current day Turkey and 
will both fit ruling and opposing roles. This essay aims to first make an assessment of the 
values the CHP champions and their relevance, and second, to suggest ways the CHP 
could reconsider its approach about some values to increase the partyʼs relevance in 
modern Turkey. It is seen that the electors are used to changes in the partyʼs policy and 
the party only gains votes and not loses by adopting new values. The current elector popu-
lation of the CHP is not significantly conservative, therefore the CHP can and should at-
tempt to change and reform. 
3. Assessment of the Relevance of the Values the CHP Champions to the Mod-
ern Day Turkey
Values that are assessed not to be much relevant with the Turkish society of the 21st 
century do not necessarily have to be changed. Although it is not the case, a political party 
can, and in my opinion should, advocate democratic values even in an environment where 
democracy is not a set of values valued much by the society. The CHP has had a trans-
formative role on the Turkish society and its values, and should carry on its transformative 
role while also transforming itself (i.e. Revolutionism which can now be interpreted as pro-
gressivism). The CHP should be transformative, but should remember that it is a political 
party competing in a system where contested elections take place and its opposition role 
can change.
Political parties cannot be expected to fit completely with each voterʼs perspectives, 
and voters look for parties that they think have a similar position for some topics with. 
Therefore, the CHP, while renewing its perspectives should have a populist approach, 
meanwhile it also should not be hesitant to defend some values such as anti-cronyism that 
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may or may not be shared by the larger public. This is the point where it should balance its 
revolutionist and populist principles. The CHP, as a healthy party of opposition and a pro-
spective ruling party, should ideally not give up its stance on subjects such as state corrup-
tion, secularism or the integrity and the unity of the state; while it also should be the advo-
cate of democracy and freedom.
a. Assessment of the Relevance of the Six Arrows
The CHP, as a political institution has played a role that no other political party in the 
Turkish political system has played. The CHP founded the republic, therefore the republic 
and the party still share an ideological background. Thus, when parties such as the Justice 
and Development Party, which is regarded to be an Islamic/Islamist party by the secular-
ists along with many international1617 and national observers18, try to reform the political 
system or almost any aspect to the country, excluding the economics, they face much re-
sistance from people, especially from those who define themselves as secular and mod-
ern. 
i. Secularism
The relevance of secularism in the public is important in assessing its relevance to 
contemporary Turkey. However, before moving on with the analysis, it should also be 
noted that secularism should be upheld by the CHP even if it loses the quality of being an 
effective component of the rhetoric, while it is a principle which is a prerequisite of democ-
racy in a predominantly muslim society. 
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16 (Cagaptay, October 26 2009)
17 (Lang and Pederson, February 20 2003)
18 (Filiz, 28 December 2010)
The relevance of secularism in Turkish society and politics can be seen through the 
“Cumhuriyet Mitingleri” (the Republic Protests) which were a set of mass rallies demanding 
that “religion and politics should be kept separate”19 and also reacting against Prime Minis-
ter Erdoganʼs candidacy for presidency and as a reaction to the AKPʼs alleged Islamist 
agenda2021. The masses held posters of Kemal Atatürk and the slogans included “Claim 
your republic”, “Turkey is secular and it will stay so” and “Unite for the republic”22, these 
testify that there is significant support for the principle of secularism23. Some reforms, such 
as the distancing of the military from politics and the perceived Islamization met resistance 
and unrest.  
Image 1. From the Republic Protests in Ankara, more than 370 000 people attended.24
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19 (BBC, 14 April 2007)
20 (Hurriyet, 20 November 2006)
21 (Hurriyet, 11 May 2007)
22 (Armutçu, Yalazan and Akin, 15 April 2007)
23 (Tavernise, April 15 2007)
24 (NTVMSNBC, 16 April 2007)
Further on, the results of 2010 referendum also testify to the relevance of the 6 arrows 
alone, 42% of the voters voted no on the referendum, and it is estimated that more than 
40% of the people who voted no casted their votes this way because of 2 clauses of the 
text25, which the opposers asserted helped AKP breach in the high judiciary system which 
is predominantly secular. These attest to the relevance of the principle of secularism in the 
society. 
ii. Nationalism
Almost all political parties in Turkey share nationalism as an essence of their rhetoric. 
The principle of nationalism of CHP is not based on ethnicity but on citizenry. Nationalism 
is still clearly relevant to the society and there is no need for the revision of this principle, 
except the CHP, as a social-democratic party, should also support tolerance towards dif-
ferent ethnicities within Turkey26. 
iii. Populism
Populism, as defined in the introduction of this essay, is still relevant in the society and 
will probably continue to be so. Populism as defined by the CHP bylaws is seeking solu-
tions among and for the people. The CHP should continue and strengthen its underscoring 
of this principle, while this will enable the party to shift its image to a problem-solver and 
not the “status-quo perpetuator”. The voters do not have much belief in their party that it 
may be able to solve the fundamental problems in the essentially contested areas. Only 
10.5 percent of the people state that they think the CHP can resolve the fundamental prob-
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25 (Hurriyet, September 14 2010) This is according to the exit polls conducted for the highly  
regarded Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet, by the polling company A&G which predicted the 
results of the referendum by at most 0.2 margins.
26 The constitution states that “All people who are bonded to the Turkish Government with 
citizenry are Turks.” (article 66), as does other examples such as the German constitution 
(article 116).
lems which they indicate are poverty and state corruption27. This will require the CHP to 
form better bonds with the public. 
iv. Republicanism
The principal of republicanism (Cumhuriyetçilik in Turkish) refers to the sovereignty of 
the people, while “cumhur” in “cumhuriyetçilik” means demos. This principle of upholding 
democracy through contested elections28 (elections whose nature is democratic and out-
come uncertain beforehand) should be one that the CHP defends along with secularism, 
as they guarantee democracy.
v. Statism
Referring to economic statism, this was limited to the government using its initiative in 
areas where the private sector is not willing or capable to do so29. Today, privatization of 
government initiatives is common, and the Turkish private sector is capable of investing in 
virtually any area. Being the 15th largest economy of the world30, and having a private sec-
tor whose spending was almost sixfold that of the governmentʼs, statism is clearly not as 
relevant as it was in the post War of Independence Turkey in which private sector was not 
powerful enough to invest as much as needed. However, the CHP can and should defend 
universal healthcare and free education as a social-democratic institution.
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28 (Przeworski, et. al., page 19)
29 (Kocaeli University Web Site, January 12 2011)
30 (World Bank, Data Sources)
Chart 1. The chart showing Turkeyʼs private and government consumption31
vi. Revolutionism
The principle of revolutionism can serve as the indent for the social democratic princi-
ples to attach. This principle allows the modification and revision of policies and principles, 
and although people may not adapt to changes in party policies as quick as the party pro-
grams do, this principle along with the founder-of-the-state role of the CHP is what makes 
the CHP a prospective problem solver. The principle of revolutionism is still relevant, as 
social and democratic institutions of secular democracies, and those of the Turkish democ-
racy are still imperfect. Challenging the thesis of the “End of History” by Francis Fu-
kuyama, Turkey still has fundamental disputes unresolved. It also holds many institutions 
and laws not suitable for a secular, social democracy as outlined in its constitution and 
founding principles. The principle of revolutionism can also be utilized to adopt the Rawl-
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sian theory of justice32. Revolutionismʼs importance cannot be overstated, Turkey needs 
reforms and the CHP should play an active role in supporting and making reforms.
Summary
The CHP can use this in its advantage, and it can combine the principle of revolution-
ism and make, suggest or support reforms. The benefit drawn from such a utilization of 
two distinct sets of principles may be the complementary usage of these, some amount of 
change of the partyʼs image as the “defender of the status quo” in liberal3334 and conserva-
tive35 spheres as testified by the opinion columns and articles in newspapers that bear the 
flags of liberalism (Taraf) and of conservatism (Zaman) as well as in the eyes of the public, 
and the realization of a second social democratic transition with emphasis on revolutionism 
and populism of the six arrows. The CHP is the only political party that can make signifi-
cant reforms in the country while not inducing doubts, through its state-founding role.
The CHP, should be more revolutionist and populist, and should de-emphasize some 
of the six arrows (such as statism) and strive to regain its social-democratic image.
b. Assessment of the Relevance of the Social Democratic Pillars
Turkey cannot be said to have concluded its democratic transition, and cronyism, cli-
entelism and such are still prevalent. In this political culture, it may be expected for strictly 
democratic and liberal values to contradict those of a part of the population as suggested 
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32 This theory is set forth in his book “A Theory of Justice” (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts 1999), and the revision of the theory was 
stated to be on the left of the centre which also fits with the CHPʼs perspectives. 
33  The “Taraf” (The Side) newspaper is, without doubt, distanced to the CHP. Most of its 
columnists either claim to be or are labeled “liberals”. This note is written in order to con-
textualize the opposition from the self-labeled liberals of Turkey against the CHP. (Ipekci, 
November 5 2010)
34  (Altinok, May 25 2010)
35 (Disli ZIbak, August 01 2010)
by an influential columnist36. However, this should not prevent the CHP from having these 
values, while it should not submit to mediocratical values. This is not to say that the CHP 
should seal its perception as elitist. 
The social-democratic values are still relevant in a society where living standards are 
still not high37 and with 70.4% of the population indicating that the most urgent problem of 
Turkey is “poverty” and 20.9% stating that it is the “inadequacy and inefficiency of the so-
cial security system”38, and poverty, income distribution and unemployment39. In such an 
environment, a social democratic party is highly needed and the statist CHP has failed to 
fill this role. 
The perception of the CHP is its being an elitist party can be broken through the prin-
ciples of social democracy, combined with populism and revolutionism. In addition, the 
CHP should regain its center-left, mass party, social democratic role. The CHP should also 
form bonds with people living in the ghettoes, villages and other places it has neglected.
4. Further Amendments to the Social and Political Values of the Party
a. Social Values
It should be noted that Turkish political culture is all-engulfing, in that, even while as-
sessing the social values that a political party should have, the subject becomes con-
cerned with politics. Social values of people do define their political leanings, and in Turkey 
this does work the other way around. 
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37 Percentage of the population suffering poverty is 15.12% according to the official data  
(TUIK, 2009)
38 (Konda 2007, page 2)
39 (Bugra, 23 May 2010)
i. The Laicist Stance
As outlined in 3.a. of this essay, secularism is a prerequisite for democracy in Turkey. 
However, this should not necessarily be considered to implicate the exclusion of religion 
from private lives of people. Although I may fail to supply enough evidence, there is a pal-
pable amount of dissent towards people who look religious from the members and mem-
bers of the parliament of the CHP. This trend should be broken, but the strict separation of 
the state and religion should not. Another problem about the CHPʼs laicist stance will con-
tinue to be its self-contradiction. The “Presidency for Religious Affairs” is one of the oldest 
institutions of the republic, being founded in 1924, and can be said to be the state appara-
tus that controls religious affairs. Although its suggestions (“fetva”s) are certainly not man-
datory to perform, its existence contradicts with the principle of the separation of the state 
and religion. The CHP should reconsider this. 
ii. Social Democracy, Social Help and Social Service
In the ruling period of the AKP, the manner of the delivery of social help has changed 
significantly. The government is now distributing aid, and people actively participate in the 
reception of it. This is often criticized by the CHP40, and the form of giving this aid can be 
subject to criticism, but the aid itself should not be. This aid should be supported to sustain 
while the CHP seeks ways to eradicate poverty and unbalance in income distribution. 
iii. Social Justice
A Rawlsian approach that fits with the current views of the party can be employed. 
Rawlsʼ theory is widely recognized to be left-of-centre after his revision of his theory. It has 
a fundamental principle that fits well with the social-democratic and progressive rhetoric 
and values. The following principle can guide, along with the whole concept of justice as 
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put forth by “A Theory of Justice” by John Rawls: “(...) laws and institutions no matter how 
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust.”41. 
iv. Stance on Ethnicities and Ethnical Politics
Turkish political life is much transformative on the public, and the public seems not to 
be disturbed by the increase of individual rights. The CHP should, support the granting of 
individual rights, but is expected to be more hesitant to do so for collective rights. Unity 
and integrity of the state are two values that the CHP has (through the principle of statism) 
and compromising on these grounds would be politically impossible for the CHP. The CHP 
should respect individual ethnicities, religions and languages as a social-democratic party.
The support for the pro-Kurdish terrorist organizaiton PKK is marginal in Turkey, and 
even if it is, the CHP cannot align itself with the demands of the PKK for the sake of gain-
ing votes.
b. Political Values
The CHP has reportedly and evidently ceased to be a mass, centre-left party. It is ap-
pealing to the city-dwelling, modern portion of the society42 (many of whom are concerned 
moderns and morally upright moderns43). “The CHP is stuck to a certain area, geographi-
cally, spatially, demographically and culturally. Thus, it is not a mass party anymore.”44.
 For the health of the political system, it should refill this role and develop its social-
democratic rhetoric and values. 
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i. Institutional Relations
 a) Relations with Socialist International and European Left-Wing Parties
The CHP in the Baykal era had gone so far as to not attending the Socialist Interna-
tional conferences and claiming that the CHP could leave the SI45 and the CHP was “cross 
with” its German counterpart Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)46. This has 
changed under Kılıçdaroğluʼs leadership47 and it is crucial for the CHP to have good rela-
tionships with its counterparts and European umbrella organizations. 
 b) Relations with the Turkish Military (TSK)
The CHP should distance itself from the military, and has been doing so. Although it 
has stayed silent towards the military intervention on politics in the past, it is now actively 
against the Military playing any role in politics48. The CHP, as a champion of democracy, 
should oppose any military intervention on politics, but not the Turkish Military itself.
 c) Stance Towards the European Union
It has been softening its relations with the EU, under Kılıçdaroğluʼs leadership, and 
should continue to do so. As a social-democratic party, the CHP should be a proponent of 
the efforts that will increase the prosperity of Turkish citizens and will increase social jus-
tice.
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ii. General Political Values
 a) Should be more liberal than its peers
Democracy, modernism, jurisdictional government are important principles that the 
CHP should pursue. The CHP, should be a trailblazer in freedoms and rights, it should not 
be perceived as an obstacle in front of reforms. Given that they do not contradict with the 
revised principles outlined above, the CHP should support the liberal interpretation and re-
form of laws and institutions.
 b) Positive and Negative Liberties (Negative Libertarianism)
Negative liberties should not suffice in the definition of liberties by the CHP. Positive 
liberties49 should also be taken into account. Whether interpreted to be collective or indi-
vidual, the CHP should emphasize positive freedom and in that the freedom of speech and 
opinion.
 c) Should Get Out of Center Politics
Eastern provinces have been much neglected by the CHP. As an indication, its share 
of votes does not exceed 2-3%percent in many eastern Anatolian provinces50. The CHP, 
as a social-democratic party, should be tolerant towards different ethnicities and should 
offer another way for the society in the eastern provinces who are stuck between the eth-
nic politics of pro-Kurdish parties and the pro-Islamic politics of the AKP in the region.
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5. Conclusion
The founding party of Turkey, hurt by the elitist and statist image, but adorned with 
social-democracy and the six arrows, can still be relevant in the contemporary Turkish poli-
tics. The CHP can, if effectively used, reinstate itself as the problem solver and reformer, 
using revolutionism and populism and its social-democratic values. The CHP can, thereon 
make and support the much needed reforms for the real democratic transition of Turkey. 
To maintain its role as a central figure of the Turkish political culture and scene, it is 
crucial for the CHP to get over the statist conservative approach it has had. The CHP is 
missing its natural supporters, who are from the middle-to-low income groups, as a social-
democratic institution, and it has been mainly become irrelevant for many. The CHP should 
use revolutionism to both change itself and transform Turkey once again, into a more (so-
cial) democratic, just state.
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